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Abstract
Previous theoretical literature proved the existence of an upper bound on eﬃciency
in bilateral bargaining. In contrast, experiments consistently ﬁnd players obtaining
higher eﬃciency than the upper bound if they are allowed to communicate before the
1
2 -double auction. We bridge this gap between theory and experiments by introducing
an  proportion of behavioral-type players who always truthfully reveal their valua-
tions and declare a keenness to trade before bidding in the 12 -double auction. Preplay
communication is used by the strategic types to communicate their “tougher” bargain-
ing position, forcing the behavioral types to adopt a “weaker” position. This further
induces the strategic types to decrease the shading/exaggeration in the announcement
of their valuations lest they miss the chance to trade with the “weaker” behavioral
types. As a result, for any  > 0, the eﬃciency in equilibrium is greater than the upper
bound.
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1 Introduction
Bilateral bargaining encounters are ubiquitous in markets. A particular model of bilateral
bargaining that has been extensively studied in the literature is the 1
2
-double auction.1 In
the 1
2
-double auction, the traders simultaneously submit sealed bids for the object and trade
takes place if and only if the buyer’s bid exceeds the seller’s bid at a price equal to the
average of the two bids. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983) ﬁnd a linear-strategy equilibrium
of the 1
2
-double auction when the valuations of the players are distributed independently
and uniformly on [0, 1] (henceforth termed CS equilibrium). However, the players’ incentives
to misrepresent their private information imply that the CS equilibrium is not ﬁrst-best
in terms of eﬃciency, that is, sometimes the players will not trade even though trade is
desirable—in fact, ﬁrst-best cannot be obtained in equilibrium of any mechanism (Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983)).2
Bargaining is, however, often preceded by communication among the players. Farrell
and Gibbons (1989) and Mathews and Postlewaite (1989) show that communication before
bidding in a double auction increases the set of equilibrium outcomes. However, none of these
additional equilibria outperform the CS equilibrium in terms of eﬃciency. In fact, Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that the CS equilibrium is second-best, that is, it achieves
both the highest ex-ante gains from trade and the highest ex-ante probability of trade relative
to any equilibrium outcome of any bilateral bargaining mechanism that the players can use.3
In particular, this means that even if the players communicate in any form (simultaneously or
sequentially) before they bid in the 1
2
-double auction, they cannot attain higher ex-ante gains
from trade or ex-ante probability of trade than that in the CS equilibrium. Hence, although
preplay communication increases the set of equilibrium outcomes of the double auction, it
cannot improve eﬃciency over the best equilibrium outcome without communication.
In a sharp contrast to these theoretical results, experimental studies by Valley et al. (2002)
and McGinn et al. (2003) on the 1
2
-double auction with uniform distribution of valuations
ﬁnd that when the players are allowed to communicate freely (either in written or verbal
form) before playing the double auction, they are able to trade much more often and hence,
1For theoretical analysis see Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983), Williams (1987), Farrell and Gibbons
(1989), Mathews and Postlewaite (1989), Leininger et al. (1989) and Satterthwaite and Williams (1989).
Radner and Schotter (1989), Valley et al. (2002) and McGinn et al. (2003) conduct experiments on the
1
2
-double auction.
2See chapter 5 in Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), Binmore et al. (1992), Kennan and Wilson (1993),
Ausubel et al. (2002) and Serrano (2008) for surveys on bargaining with incomplete information.
3This is not true for generic distributions of valuations as shown by Satterthwaite and Williams (1989).
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attain much higher ex-ante gains from trade and ex-ante probability of trade than the CS
equilibrium.4 For instance, Valley et al. (2002, Table 1) report that when the players were not
allowed to communicate, trade occurred in only 54% of the cases with positive gains; whereas
when the players communicated face-to-face before the double auction, trade occurred in 85%
of the cases with positive gains. In this paper, we are interested in bridging this gap between
theory and experimental evidence.5
Valley et al. (2002) and McGinn et al. (2003) ﬁnd that improved eﬃciency in communica-
tion treatments is driven by the choice of the following three dyadic strategies by the players
(i) coordination on a single price (ii) mutual revelation of valuations and (iii) mutual bidding
of valuations. For instance, Valley et al. (2002) ﬁnd that in the communication treatments,
out of 129 pairs of players with positive gains from trade, 73 coordinated on a single price
and 8 mutually revealed their valuations. In their communication treatments, McGinn et al.
(2003) ﬁnd that out of 50 pairs with positive gains from trade, 21 coordinated on a single
price, 13 mutually revealed their valuations and 10 mutually bid their valuations. These
ﬁndings of dyadic behavior in bargaining with preplay communication prompt Valley et al.
(2002, p. 151) to conclude:
Bargaining often occurs with some communication between the parties. If, as our ﬁndings
suggest, this communication substantially changes the strategies chosen by the players, then
the critical consequences of communication—coordination and honest revelation—need to be
considered in future theories of bargaining.
Mathews and Postlewaite (1989) have shown that in equilibrium, preplay communication
can be used by diﬀerent valuation-type pairs of the players to coordinate on diﬀerent single-
price equilibria in the double auction. However, as mentioned above, this coordination does
not improve eﬃciency over the CS equilibrium. In light of the experimental evidence, this
suggests that the missing element in theoretical models is “honest revelation”. Theoretical
models assume that all players are strategic who misrepresent private information whenever
they have the incentive to do so.6 Whereas evidence suggests that players are averse to
lying. For instance, McGinn et al. (2003) ﬁnd that over 50% of the players honestly revealed
4In their experiment, Radner and Schotter (1989) also ﬁnd that face-to-face negotiations outperform
the CS equilibrium of the 1
2
-double auction in terms of eﬃciency. However, in the face-to-face negotia-
tions, players both communicated and bargained at the same time. We are instead interested in preplay
communication.
5There is also evidence that communication improves eﬃciency in games other than double auctions. For
instance, see Hoﬀman and Spitzer (1982) and Valley et al. (1998).
6For exceptions see Sobel (1985), Dasgupta (1988), Severinov and Deneckere (2006) and Saran (2008).
Nonstrategic behavior other than honesty has also been studied in Kreps et al. (1982), Kreps and Wilson
(1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Abreu and Gul (2000).
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their valuations.7 We show that relaxing the assumption of strategic behavior and instead
assuming that an  > 0 proportion of the population is honest in communication is suﬃcient
to obtain a higher eﬃciency than the CS equilibrium in an equilibrium of a 1
2
-double auction
with preplay communication.
The bargaining model is a 1
2
-double auction preceded by a single simultaneous round
of communication. In the communication stage, each player (a buyer and a seller) simul-
taneously sends two messages. As a ﬁrst message, a player announces her valuation (not
necessarily truthfully). As a second message, a player declares either that she is keen to trade
or that she is not keen trade. Each player can have one of the two dispositions, strategic
type or behavioral type. The probability that a player is behavioral type is . The valuations
of both the players irrespective of their disposition types are distributed uniformly on [0, 1].
A behavioral-type player is nonstrategic only in communication. In the communication
stage, a behavioral type honestly reveals her valuation and declares that she is keen to trade
(it is not necessary that the behavioral types announce “keen to trade”; see Section 4).8 No
further assumption is made about the behavior of the behavioral types in the double auction.
Thus, the behavioral types play sequentially rational strategies in the double auction.
We ﬁnd a fully separating equilibrium of the game. Strategic-type players use the com-
munication stage to both signal their valuations and their intention to adopt a “tougher”
bargaining position in the double auction. To signal her valuation, a strategic-type player
announces a unique shaded/exaggerated valuation. The amount of shading/exaggeration is,
however, constrained since players walk away from trade in case the announced valuations
suggest that there are no gains from trade. During preplay communication, the strate-
gic types also announce that they are not keen to trade. In equilibrium, the player who
announces that she is not keen to trade takes a “tougher” position in the double auction
conceding no gains from trade suggested by the announced valuations if the other player is
keen to trade and at most half the gains from trade suggested by the announced valuations
if the other player is also not keen to trade. In contrast, the player who announces that she
is keen to trade takes a “weaker” position in the double auction conceding all the gains from
trade suggested by the announced valuations if the other player is not keen to trade and at
most half the gains from trade suggested by the announced valuations if the other player
announces that she is also keen to trade. Therefore, by announcing that she is not keen to
trade, a strategic-type player signals her intention to adopt a “tougher” bargaining position
7For more evidence on aversion to lying, see Lundquist et al. (2009).
8That is why we purposely refrain from calling preplay communication “cheap talk”; it is not “costless”
for behavioral types to send any message.
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in the double auction. This separates a strategic type from the behavioral types who in turn
must accept a “weaker” position in the double auction (since they cannot imitate strategic
types in order to signal a “tougher” position). Hence, the messages of keen and not keen in
the communication stage help in coordinating the bargaining positions of diﬀerent disposi-
tion types of the players in the double auction. An outcome of this coordination is that in
equilibrium, players coordinate on a single price in the double auction, which is determined
by both the announced valuations and the bargaining positions signaled by each of them.
Our main result is that for any  > 0 and for any ex-post realization of disposition types,
the trading region in our fully separating equilibrium is a strict superset of the trading region
in the CS equilibrium. In particular, this means that for any  > 0, the ex-ante gains from
trade and the ex-ante probability of trade in our equilibrium is strictly higher than the CS
equilibrium. As  increases, then irrespective of the disposition types of the players, the
trading regions inch closer to the ﬁrst-best trading region. Thus both the ex-ante gains from
trade and the ex-ante probability of trade in our equilibrium increase as  increases.
Like Mathews and Postlewaite (1989), diﬀerent type pairs of the players use preplay
communication to coordinate on diﬀerent single-price equilibria in the double auction; yet
they are able to trade more often than the CS equilibrium. Intuitively, the presence of
behavioral types who honestly reveal their valuations and accept a “weaker” position in
the double auction induces the strategic types to reduce the shading/exaggeration in the
announcements of their valuations lest they loose the chance to trade with the behavioral
types at a “good” price. Thus, our analysis suggests that preplay communication improves
eﬃciency not just due to coordination on single price and honest revelation by a proportion
of the population; the strategic response of using preplay communication to signal their
“tougher” bargaining position against such honest players is also an important factor.
We outline the model, solve for the equilibrium and present comparative statics with
respect to  in Section 2. We compare the equilibrium outcome with the CS equilibrium in
Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the robustness of the results. We conclude in Section 5
and collect all the proofs in Section 6.
2 Model
There are two players, a buyer (denoted by b) and a seller (denoted by s). The seller owns
an indivisible object that she would like to trade with the buyer.
Each player i can have one of the two dispositions (di), behavioral (denoted by bh)
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and strategic (denoted by st). The probability that a player is a behavioral type is  ∈
(0, 1), which is independent of the valuation and disposition types of the other player. The
valuations of both disposition types of a player are distributed uniformly on [0, 1] and are
also independent of the other player’s valuation and disposition. Each player privately knows
her type (vi, di) but does not know the true type of the other player. The probability  and
the distributions of valuations of the players are common knowledge.
Denote the valuations of the buyer and seller by vb and vs, respectively. If the object is
traded at price p, then the buyer’s payoﬀ is vb − p while the seller’s payoﬀ is p − vs. Both
players get a payoﬀ of 0 if the good is not traded.
The players trade using the 1
2
-double auction with a preplay communication stage. In
the communication stage, the players simultaneously make two announcements. Firstly, a
player announces her valuation in [0, 1]. Secondly, a player announces whether she is keen
(K) or not keen (NK) to trade. Thus, each player i sends a pair of messages (m1i , m
2
i ) in the
communication stage, where m1i ∈ [0, 1] and m2i ∈ {K,NK}. After the communication stage,
the players play the 1
2
-double auction. In the 1
2
-double auction, both players simultaneously
bid for the object. The object is traded if and only if the buyer’s bid tb is at least as high as
the seller’s bid ts at a price equal to the average of both the bids.
Behavioral types act nonstrategically only during preplay communication. In the com-
munication stage, a behavioral-type player announces her true valuation and that she is keen
to trade. However, the behavioral types are strategic in the 1
2
-double auction that follows
the communication stage. That is, in the double auction, like a strategic type, a behavioral-
type player takes into account the information from the communication stage to update her
beliefs and plays a best-response to the other player’s strategy.
The equilibrium concept we use is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (see Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991)), modiﬁed to incorporate the nonstrategic behavior of the behavioral types in the
communication stage. In our model, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is a set of strategies
and beliefs such that (i) in any continuation game, the beliefs of the players (both strategic
and behavioral type) are updated using Bayes rule (if possible) and, given those beliefs, the
strategies of the players (both strategic and behavioral type) are a Bayesian equilibrium
(irrespective of whether the continuation game is on or oﬀ-the-equilibrium path) and (ii)
given the strategies and beliefs in the continuation games, strategies of the strategic-type
players in the communication stage are a Bayesian equilibrium of the reduced game in which
the players’ payoﬀs after any pair of announcements are given by their expected payoﬀs in
the corresponding continuation game.
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The next proposition speciﬁes a fully separating symmetric equilibrium of the game.9
Our proof is such that we do not have to specify (i) the belief of any type of player i in
any oﬀ-the-equilibrium path continuation game [(m1b , m
2
b), (m
1
s, m
2
s)] (i.e., the continuation
game after such a pair of announcements) such that the message (m1j , m
2
j) is not used by
any type of player j in equilibrium and (ii) the strategy of any type of any player i in any
continuation game [(m1b , m
2
b), (m
1
s, m
2
s)] such that both messages (m
1
b , m
2
b) and (m
1
s, m
2
s) are
used respectively by some type of buyer and seller in equilibrium but (m1i , m
2
i ) is not an
equilibrium message of that type of player i.
Proposition 1. Deﬁne α() =
5−3+
√
(5−3)2+16(1−)
4
, β() = (1−)
2
[4(1−)+2α()][3(1−)+2α()]
and
γ() = 1−
4(1−)+2α()
. The following strategies and beliefs are a perfect Bayesian equilibrium:
• Strategies:
1. For the behavioral-type buyer of valuation vb:
(a) In the communication stage, announce m1b = vb and m
2
b = K.
(b) In the double-auction stage,
 if (m1b , m2b) = (vb, K), (m1s, m2s) is a message used in equilibrium by some
type of the seller and
∗ if m1s > m1b , then bid 0.
∗ if m1s ≤ m1b and m2s = K, then bid 12(m1b + m1s).
∗ if m1s ≤ m1b and m2s = NK, then bid m1b .
 if for any player i, the message (m1i , m2i ) is not used in equilibrium by any
type of player i, then bid 0.
2. For the strategic-type buyer of valuation vb:
(a) In the communication stage, announce m2b = NK and
m1b(vb) ≡
{
α()vb + β() if vb ≥ γ()
vb if vb < γ()
(b) In the double-auction stage,
9The equilibrium is symmetric in the sense that if the buyer and seller have the same disposition, then (i)
in the communication stage, they announce the same keen or not keen to trade message and the valuation
announced by the buyer of valuation v is equal to 1 minus the valuation announced by the seller of valuation
1 − v and (ii) in the double-auction stage, they demand the same share of the surplus suggested by the
announced valuations from their opponent.
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 if (m1b , m2b) = (m1b(vb), NK), (m1s, m2s) is a message used in equilibrium
by some type of the seller and
∗ if m1s > m1b , then bid 0.
∗ if m1s ≤ m1b and m2s = K, then bid m1s.
∗ if m1s ≤ m1b and m2s = NK, then bid 12(m1b + m1s).
 if for any player i, the message (m1i , m2i ) is not used in equilibrium by any
type of player i, then bid 0.
3. For the behavioral-type seller of valuation vs:
(a) In the communication stage, announce m1s = vs and m
2
s = K.
(b) In the double-auction stage,
 if (m1s, m2s) = (vs, K), (m1b , m2b) is a message used in equilibrium by some
type of the buyer and
∗ if m1s > m1b , then bid 1.
∗ if m1s ≤ m1b and m2b = K, then bid 12(m1b + m1s).
∗ if m1s ≤ m1b and m2b = NK, then bid m1s.
 if for any player i, the message (m1i , m2i ) is not used in equilibrium by any
type of player i, then bid 1.
4. For the strategic-type seller of valuation vs:
(a) In the communication stage, announce m2s = NK and
m1s(vs) ≡
{
α()vs + γ() if vs ≤ α() + β()
vs if vs > α() + β()
(b) In the double-auction stage,
 if (m1s, m2s) = (m1s(vs), NK), (m1b , m2b) is a message used in equilibrium
by some type of the buyer and
∗ if m1s > m1b , then bid 1.
∗ if m1s ≤ m1b and m2b = K, then bid m1b .
∗ if m1s ≤ m1b and m2b = NK, then bid 12(m1b + m1s).
 if for any player i, the message (m1i , m2i ) is not used in equilibrium by any
type of player i, then bid 1.
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• Beliefs: In any continuation game [(m1b , m2b), (m1s, m2s)] such that the message (m1i , m2i )
is used in equilibrium by some type (vi, di) of player i in the communication stage, the
belief of player j is that player i is of type (vi, di).
Thus, in equilibrium, unlike the behavioral types, all strategic types announce that they
are not keen to trade and some strategic types shade or exaggerate their announced val-
uations relative to their true valuations. In particular, a strategic-type buyer of valuation
vb announces her valuation as m
1
b(vb) = min{vb, α()vb + β()}. Note that m1b(vb) is a
piecewise-linear and continuous function that takes the value vb whenever vb ≤ γ() and the
value α()vb + β() < vb whenever vb > γ() (see Lemma 2). Thus, low valuation types
of the strategic-type buyer—those with vb ≤ γ()—truthfully reveal their valuations while
high valuation types of the strategic-type buyer—those with vb > γ()—shade their an-
nounced valuations to α()vb + β() < vb (see Figure 1). Similarly, a strategic-type seller
of valuation vs announces her valuation as m
1
s(vs) = max{vs, α()vs + γ()}. m1s(vs) is also
a piecewise-linear and continuous function and it takes the value α()vs + γ() > vs when-
ever vs < α() + β() and the value vs whenever vs ≥ α()vs + γ() (see Lemma 3). Thus,
high valuation types of the strategic-type seller—those with vs ≥ α() + β()—truthfully
reveal their valuations while low valuation types of the strategic-type seller—those with
vs < α() + β()—exaggerate their announced valuations to α()vs + γ() > vs (see Figure
1).
In the double-auction stage, all types of the players walk away from trade by bidding the
extreme values of 0 or 1 if the announced valuations suggest that there can be no gains from
trade, that is, m1s > m
1
b . Whereas if the announced valuations are such that m
1
s ≤ m1b , then
a strategic-type of player i coordinates on the price of m1j if player j is keen to trade while
she coordinates on the price of 1
2
(m1b + m
1
s) if player j is not keen to trade. On the other
hand, if the announced valuations are such that m1s ≤ m1b , then a behavioral-type of player
i coordinates on the price of 1
2
(m1b + m
1
s) if player j is keen to trade while she coordinates
on the price of m1i if player j is not keen to trade. Simply put, the players coordinate
on either a single-price or no-trade equilibrium in the double-auction stage continuation
games. However, in coordinating on a single-price equilibrium, diﬀerent dispositions types
adopt diﬀerent bargaining positions in the double auction. Strategic types take a “tougher”
position conceding no gains from trade suggested by the announced valuations if the other
player is keen to trade and at most half the gains from trade suggested by the announced
valuations if the other player is also not keen to trade. As a response, behavioral types
accept a “weaker” position conceding all the gains from trade suggested by the announced
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valuations if the other player is not keen to trade and at most half the gains from trade
suggested by the announced valuations if the other player announces that she is also keen to
trade.
The reason why some strategic types reveal their valuations truthfully is because their
announced valuations do not impact the price at which they trade in the double auction. For
instance, consider the strategic-type buyer of valuation vb ≤ γ(). In the double auction, it
is not optimal for her to trade with those types of the seller whose announced valuations are
greater than vb since such types of the seller always bid at least vb. Thus, our strategic-type
buyer would not want to announce any valuation greater than her true valuation. However,
the only types of the seller whose announced valuations are at most vb ≤ γ() are the
behavioral types of the seller of valuations vs ≤ vb. These behavioral types of the seller bid
equal to their true valuations vs in the double auction if the buyer announces that she is not
keen to trade and m1b ≥ m1s = vs. Thus, if our strategic buyer were to shade her announced
valuation, then she would loose the opportunity to trade with some behavioral types of the
seller without impacting the price of any gainful trade.
On the other hand, the reason why some strategic types shade/exaggerate their an-
nounced valuations relative to their true valuations is because their announced valuations
impact the price at which they trade in the double auction. For instance, consider the
strategic-type buyer of valuation vb > γ(). Again, this strategic-type buyer would not want
to announce any valuation greater than her true valuation; it is not optimal for her to trade
with those types of the seller whose announced valuations are greater than vb since such
types of the seller always bid at least vb. But now there are both behavioral and strategic
types of the seller whose announced valuations are at most vb. The valuation announced by
our strategic-type buyer only determines the probability she trades with a behavioral type
of the seller since such a seller bids equal to her true valuation vs in the double auction if the
buyer announces that she is not keen to trade and m1b ≥ m1s = vs. However, the valuation
announced by our strategic-type buyer not only determines the probability she trades with
a strategic type of the seller but also the price of such a trade since such a seller bids equal
to 1
2
(m1b +m
1
s) in the double auction if the buyer announces that she is not keen to trade and
m1b ≥ m1s. Thus, a strategic-type buyer of valuation vb > γ() faces a trade-oﬀ between a
higher probability of trade if she were to announce a higher valuation versus a lower price if
she were to announce a lower valuation. Thus, it is optimal for her to shade her announced
valuation; after all, trading with a seller who bids close to vb generates very little proﬁt but
increases the price on a large fraction of trades. It is also not optimal for any strategic type
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to imitate another behavioral type by announcing that she is keen to trade. Consider the
two announcements (m1b , K) and (m
1
b , NK) (the proof takes care of all cases). If a strategic-
type buyer were to announce (m1b , K) instead of (m
1
b , NK), then this does not change the
probability that she trades with any seller since the announced valuations are the same in
both announcements. However, announcing that she is keen to trade instead of not keen to
trade indicates to the seller that she is a behavioral type who will take a “weaker” bargaining
position in the double auction. This induces all types of the seller to bid higher and thus
demand a higher share of the gains from trade suggested by the announced valuations, which
is obviously not in the buyer’s interest.
2.1 Comparative statics with respect to 
Before we discuss how a change in  impacts the equilibrium outcome, we note the following
properties of α(), β() and γ() (proof is available upon request):
Lemma 1. Properties of α(), β() and γ().
1. α ′() > 0, lim
→0
α() =
2
3
and lim
→1
α() = 1.
2. β ′() < 0, lim
→0
β() =
1
12
and lim
→1
β() = 0.
3. γ ′() < 0, lim
→0
γ() =
1
4
and lim
→0
γ() = 0.
Since α(), β() and γ() determine the valuations announced by the strategic types in
the communication stage, a change in  changes these announcements. Figure 1 shows how
by comparing the valuations announced by the strategic types when  = 0.01 and  = 0.5.
As the ﬁgure shows, an increase in  induces some strategic types to shade/exaggerate less—
mathematically, this is due to α ′() > 0—while some strategic types shade/exaggerate more
due to an increase in —mathematically, this is due to β ′(), γ ′() < 0. Intuitively, an
increase in  means that the other player is more likely to be behavioral type who announces
her valuation truthfully in the communication stage. Then any level of shading/exaggeration
in the communication stage becomes more costly since the player is more likely to loose the
opportunity to trade as the behavioral types walk away from trade if the other players’
announced valuation suggest that there do not exist any gains from trade. This explains
why high-valuation types of the strategic-type buyer shade less and low-valuation types of
the strategic-type seller exaggerate less in the communication stage when  increases. This
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Figure 1: Valuations announced by the strategic types in the communication stage: Lines below
(above) the diagonal are for the buyer (seller). When  = 0.01, all valuation types of the strategic-
type buyer with vb > γ(0.01) shade and all valuation types of the strategic-type seller with vs <
α(0.01) + β(0.01) exaggerate their announced valuations (solid-gray lines); whereas all valuation
types of the strategic-type buyer with vb ≤ γ(0.01) and all valuation types of the strategic-type
seller with vs ≥ α(0.01) + β(0.01) truthfully reveal their valuations (dashed-gray lines). On the
other hand, when  = 0.5, all valuation types of the strategic-type buyer with vb > γ(0.5) shade and
all valuation types of the strategic-type seller with vs < α(0.5) + β(0.5) exaggerate their announced
valuations (solid-black lines); whereas all valuation types of the strategic-type buyer with vb ≤ γ(0.5)
and all valuation types of the strategic-type seller with vs ≥ α(0.5) + β(0.5) truthfully reveal their
valuations (dashed-gray lines).
in turn induces the low-valuation types of the strategic-type buyer to shade more and high-
valuation types of the strategic-type seller to exaggerate more in the communication stage.
For instance, less exaggeration by the low-valuation types of the strategic-type seller when
 increases implies that for a low-valuation type of the strategic-type buyer, the probability
that the seller announces a valuation less than her valuation increases. Therefore, such a
strategic-type buyer prefers to take advantage of this by reducing her announced valuation
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and thereby reducing the price at which she trades with the strategic types of the sellers in
the double-auction stage.
Using Lemma 1, we note that lim
→1
[α()vb + β()] = vb and lim
→1
[α()vs + γ()] = vs.
Therefore, as  converges to 1, all strategic types of the players truthfully announce their
respective valuations in the communication stage. On the other hand, lim
→0
[α()vb + β()] =
2
3
vb +
1
12
and lim
→0
[α()vs + γ()] =
2
3
vs +
1
4
. The reader will recall that the CS equilibrium is
such that the buyer bids min
{
vb,
2
3
vb +
1
12
}
while the seller bids max
{
vs,
2
3
vs +
1
4
}
. Thus,
as  converges to 0, the valuations announced by the strategic types of the players in the
communication stage converge to the respective CS equilibrium bids.
3 Comparison with CS equilibrium
An allocation rule is a pair of functions (p, x) such that for any pair of types of the two players
(vb, db) and (vs, ds), p[(vb, db), (vs, ds)] ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that the object is traded and
x[(vb, db), (vs, ds)] ∈ 	 is the payment from the buyer to the seller. It is straightforward
to check that the allocation rule obtained in the equilibrium speciﬁed in Proposition 1 is
such that (in specifying p[(vb, st), (vs, st)], we use the fact that γ() =
γ()−β()
α()
; see proof of
Lemma 2):
p[(vb, st), (vs, st)] =
{
1 if vb ≥ vs + γ()
0 if vb < vs + γ()
p[(vb, st), (vs, bh)] =
{
1 if min{vb, α()vb + β()} ≥ vs
0 if min{vb, α()vb + β()} < vs
p[(vb, bh), (vs, st)] =
{
1 if vb ≥ max{vs, α()vs + γ()}
0 if vb < max{vs, α()vs + γ()}
p[(vb, bh), (vs, bh)] =
{
1 if vb ≥ vs
0 if vb < vs
In the CS equilibrium, the allocation rule is a function only of the pair of valuations since
both players are only strategic type. The allocation rule obtained in the CS equilibrium is
such that the probability of trade is as follows:
pCS(vb, vs) =
{
1 if vb ≥ vs + 14
0 if vb < vs +
1
4
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The following corollary is our main result.
Corollary 1. The following hold for any  ∈ (0, 1).
1. For any ex-post realization of types [(vb, db), (vs, ds)], the allocation rule obtained in our
equilibrium is such that p[(vb, db), (vs, ds)] ≥ pCS(vb, vs).
2. For any ex-post realization of disposition types (db, ds), there exists a set of positive
measure V ⊂ [0, 1]× [0, 1] such that for all (vb, vs) ∈ V , the allocation rule obtained in
our equilibrium has p[(vb, db), (vs, ds)] = 1 > 0 = p
CS(vb, vs).
0 1
0
1
   
 
 
γ()
α() + β()
0.25
0.75
vs
vb
CS Trading Region
Figure 2: Trading Regions: The region below the dashed-black line is where trade is desirable.
This is also the trading region in the event both players are behavioral type. The region below
the solid-black line is the trading region in the event both players are strategic type. The region
below the dotted-black line that kinks at [γ(), γ()] is the trading region in the event the buyer
is strategic and the seller is behavior type. The region below the dotted-black line that kinks at
[α() + β(), α() + β()] is the trading region in the event the buyer is behavioral and the seller is
strategic type. The solid gray region is the trading region in the CS equilibrium.
Thus, if a pair of valuation types (vb, vs) trades in the CS equilibrium, then that pair of
valuation types also trades in our equilibrium irrespective of the corresponding disposition
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types of the players. Figure 2 graphically conveys the meaning of the above corollary. For
any  ∈ (0, 1) and for any realization of the disposition types of the two players, the set of
valuations types who trade in our equilibrium is larger that the set of valuations types who
trade in the CS equilibrium.
Therefore, for any  ∈ (0, 1), the ex-ante probability of trade conditional on any realiza-
tion of the disposition types of the two players is higher in our equilibrium compared to the
CS equilibrium. This further implies that for any  ∈ (0, 1), the total ex-ante probability
of trade in higher in our equilibrium than in the CS equilibrium. Figure 3 shows the total
ex-ante probability of trade and ex-ante probabilities of trade conditional on diﬀerent real-
ization of disposition types as functions of . Recall that the valuations announced by the
strategic-type players converge to the CS equilibrium bids as  converges to 0. That is why,
as shown in the ﬁgure, the total ex-ante probability of trade and the ex-ante probability of
trade conditional on both players being strategic type converge to 0.28125 (the ex-ante prob-
ability of trade in the CS equilibrium) as  converges to 0. On the other hand, as  converges
to 1, all strategic types truthfully announce their respective valuations in the communication
stage. Therefore, the total ex-ante probability of trade and the ex-ante probability of trade
conditional on any realization of disposition types converge to 0.5 as  converges to 1.
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Figure 3: Ex-ante probability of trade for diﬀerent values of : Dashed-black line shows the total
ex-ante probability of trade. Dotted-black line shows the ex-ante probability of trade in the event
that one player is strategic and the other player is behavioral type. Solid-black line shows the ex-
ante probability of trade in the event that both players are strategic type. The ex-ante probability
of trade in the event that both players are behavioral type is 0.5 for all . 0.28125 is the ex-ante
probability of trade in the CS equilibrium.
In our equilibrium, any pair of types [(vb, db), (vs, ds)] trade with a positive probability
only if vb ≥ vs. Therefore, Corollary 1 also implies that our equilibrium generates at least
as much ex-post gains from trade as the CS equilibrium and irrespective of the realization of
the disposition types, there exists a positive measure of valuations types who obtain strictly
higher ex-post gains from trade in our equilibrium compared to the CS equilibrium. Thus,
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Figure 4: Ex-ante gains from trade for diﬀerent values of : Dashed-black line shows the total
ex-ante gains from trade. Dotted-black line shows the ex-ante gains from trade in the event that
one player is strategic and the other player is behavioral type. Solid-black line shows the ex-ante
gains from trade in the event that both players are strategic type. The ex-ante gains from trade in
the event that both players are behavioral type are 1/6 (the highest possible value) for all . The
ex-ante gains from trade in the CS equilibrium are 9/64.
the allocation rule obtained in our equilibrium dominates the CS equilibrium in terms of
ex-post gains from trade. This of course implies that players obtain higher ex-ante gains
from trade conditional on any realization of disposition types and hence higher total ex-ante
gains from trade than in the CS equilibrium. Figure 4 shows the total ex-ante gains from
trade and ex-ante gains from trade conditional on diﬀerent realization of disposition types
as functions of . Again, as  converges to 0, the announced valuations converge to the
CS equilibrium bids and therefore, the total ex-ante gains from trade and the ex-ante gains
from trade conditional on both players being strategic type converge to 9
64
(the ex-ante gains
from trade in CS equilibrium). While, as  converges to 1, strategic types announce their
valuations truthfully; so the total ex-ante gains from trade and the ex-ante gains from trade
conditional on any realization of disposition types converge to the highest possible value of
1
6
.
4 Discussion
Is preplay communication necessary? The allocation rule obtained in our equilibrium
cannot be obtained without preplay communication. To see this, consider the strategic-type
buyer of valuation vb. Pick a vs such that m
1
s(vs) ≤ m1b(vb). If the seller is a strategic-type
of valuation vs, then the price paid by the strategic-type buyer is
1
2
[m1b(vb) +m
1
s(vs)], which
increase as vb increase, whereas if the seller is a behavioral-type of valuation vs, then the price
paid by the strategic-type buyer is vs, which does not depend on vb. This cannot happen in
a double auction; if the price paid by a buyer to a type of the seller with whom she trades
changes as her valuation changes then so must the price paid by her to another type of the
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seller with whom she trades.
A related question is does there exist some other allocation rule that can be obtained
in equilibrium without preplay communication but has strictly higher ex-ante gains from
trade or ex-ante probability of trade than the CS equilibrium? The answer is no, given our
weak assumption about the behavioral types. We have only assumed that the behavioral
types communicate nonstrategically. In the double auction, behavioral types act strategi-
cally. Thus, without preplay communication, all types will act strategically and hence, any
equilibrium allocation rule will be subject to the upper bound on eﬃciency that is obtained
in the CS equilibrium. This is in line with the experiments that do not observe any signiﬁ-
cant improvement in eﬃciency over the CS equilibrium when the players are not allowed to
communicate before bidding in the double auction (Radner and Schotter (1989), Valley et
al. (2002), McGinn et al. (2003)). Of course, it might be possible that if we make some other
assumption about the behavioral types in the double auction without preplay communica-
tion, then we do obtain an equilibrium allocation rule that beats the CS-equilibrium upper
bound on eﬃciency. However, in our opinion, the experimental evidence does not oﬀer any
basis for such an assumption.
Is it necessary that the players have the option to announce messages other than
their valuations? We assumed that in the communication stage, the players have the
option to announce not only their respective valuations but also whether they are keen or
not keen to trade. If players diﬀer not only in terms of their valuations but also in terms of
their strategic or behavioral disposition, then the type of a player is a pair (vi, di). Moreover,
the behavioral types truthfully announce their respective valuations in the communication
stage. Therefore, in order to construct a fully separating equilibrium, we need that the
message space for any player in the communication stage is richer than the set of valuations.
Furthermore, some separation between the two disposition types in the communication
stage is necessary for an improvement in eﬃciency. For instance, consider the set of equilibria
in which there is no separation between the disposition types during the communication
stage; thus, each strategic type of valuation vi also announces (vi, K).
10 Even though these
equilibria have a complete separation between the valuation types, it can be shown that no
such equilibrium has a higher ex-ante gains from trade or ex-ante probability of trade than
the CS equilibrium.11 Thus, some separation between the disposition types is necessary to
10The set of such equilibria is nonempty; in fact, any equilibrium outcome of the 1
2
-double auction without
preplay communication can be obtained in some such equilibrium.
11Since the disposition types do not separate in the communication stage and the behavioral types bid
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provide adequate incentives to the strategic-type players to reduce the misrepresentation of
their private information that causes ineﬃciencies. Such incentives are present in our fully
separating equilibrium—however, full separation is not always suﬃcient for the result.12 By
announcing that they are not keen to trade, the strategic types make known their “tougher”
bargaining position, which separates them from the behavioral types who are left to accept
a “weaker” bargaining position because of their inability to deviate in the communication
stage. This in turn reduces the shading/exaggeration in the announcement of their valuations
by the strategic types; otherwise, they are more likely to miss the opportunity to trade with
the “weaker” behavioral types.
In the real world or in experiments with unfettered preplay communication, bargainers
indeed have access to a rich message space. In such instances, bargainers do not restrict
themselves to announcing only their valuations. Valley et al. (2002, p. 148) quote a seller in
their experiment who sent the following message to the buyer, “Let’s get down to business.
We are here to earn money, right? So, we’ll have to negotiate. Let’s be straight and honest.
My cost is $19.” This seller is clearly suggesting more than just that her cost is $19; she
also wants the buyer to believe that she is “straight and honest”. And even if the players
cannot send such explicit verbal or written messages, simple cues like smiles, winks and
handshakes are always available whenever players are face-to-face. As Manzini et al. (2009)
show in their experiment on the minimum eﬀort game, such simple cues have signiﬁcant
informational value and are used by players as coordination devices.
Is it necessary that the behavioral types announce “keen to trade”? No, all
the results can be obtained if were to instead assume that a behavioral-type player only
truthfully reveals her valuation in preplay communication. However, we will have to change
the preplay message space accordingly. Suppose that in the communication stage each player
must simultaneously announce her valuation twice—again, since type is a pair, we need a
message space that is richer than the set of valuations. But in announcing her valuation,
a player can choose any real number. Thus, the set of messages available to each player i
is (m1i , m
2
i ) ∈ 	2. After this communication stage, the players play the 12-double auction.
Being truthful, any behavioral-type player of valuation vi sends the message (vi, vi). There
exists an equilibrium of this game which attains the same allocation rule as the equilibrium
strategically, the allocation rule obtained in such an equilibrium is incentive compatible (no type of a player
can gain by imitating another type of the player) and individually rational (each type gets a nonnegative
expected payoﬀ). The result follows using Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
12For instance, there exists a fully separating equilibrium in which after any pair of announcements, the
players play the no-trade equilibrium.
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in Proposition 1. In this equilibrium, the strategic-type player of valuation vi sends the
same ﬁrst message m1i = m
1
i (vi) as in Proposition 1 but for the second message she chooses
a number m2i (vi) /∈ [0, 1]. By sending m2i (vi) /∈ [0, 1], this strategic type separates herself
from any behavioral type. In any continuation game with m1j = m
2
j = vj ∈ [0, 1], each
type of player i plays the same strategy as in the continuation game following a (vj, K)
announcement in the equilibrium in Proposition 1; whereas in any continuation game with
m1j = m
1
j (vj) and m
2
j = m
2
j (vj) for some vj ∈ [0, 1], each type of player i plays the same
strategy as in the continuation game following a (m1j , NK) announcement in the equilibrium
in Proposition 1. In all other continuations games, the players play the no-trade equilibrium.
Thus, like in the equilibrium in Proposition 1, the strategic-type players are able to signal
their valuations using the ﬁrst message and their intention to adopt a “tougher” bargaining
position in the double auction using the second message.
5 Conclusion
We proved that, like in the experiments on bargaining with preplay communication, it is also
theoretically feasible to obtain a higher eﬃciency that the CS equilibrium if we adjust the
theoretical models in light of evidence from these very experiments, which suggests that a
proportion of the population nonstrategically reveals their private information during preplay
communication. Our theoretical analysis not only conﬁrms the experimental ﬁnding that
honest revelation and coordination on single-price equilibira using preplay communication
enhances eﬃciency but also provides a novel explanation: the strategic response of using
preplay communication to signal their “tougher” bargaining intentions against the honest
players that in turn induces the strategic types to reduce the misrepresentation of their
private information.
Nevertheless, the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is not the unique equilibrium of the game
(see Section 4). There are many equilibria that have lower total ex-ante gains from trade or
ex-ante probability of trade than the CS equilibrium. This raises the following question: what
guarantees that the players coordinate on the equilibrium in Proposition 1 that improves
eﬃciency? Although this is an important question, it is beyond the scope of this paper and
is left for future research.
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6 Proofs
Lemma 2. vb  α()vb + β() ⇐⇒ vb  γ().
Proof. Let f(vb) = vb and g(vb) = α()vb + β(). Now, f
′(vb) = 1 and g
′(vb) = α() ∈(
2
3
, 1
)
(follows from Lemma 1). Therefore, to prove the lemma, it is suﬃcient to show that
α()γ() + β() = γ().
β() + γ()[α()− 1]
=γ()
(
1− 
3(1− ) + 2α() − [1− α()]
)
=
γ()
3(1− ) + 2α(){1− − [1− α()][3(1− ) + 2α()]}
=
γ()
3(1− ) + 2α(){2[α()]
2 − (5− 3)α()− 2(1− )}
=0,
where the last equality follows from the fact that α() =
5−3+
√
(5−3)2+16(1−)
4
is a root of
the quadratic equation 2[α()]2 − (5− 3)α()− 2(1− ) = 0.
Lemma 3. vs  α()vs + γ() ⇐⇒ vs  α() + β().
Proof. Let fˆ(vs) = vs and gˆ(vs) = α()vs + γ(). Now, fˆ
′(vs) = 1 and gˆ
′(vs) = α() ∈(
2
3
, 1
)
(follows from Lemma 1). Therefore, to prove the lemma, it is suﬃcient to show that
α()[α() + β()] + γ() = α() + β().
α()[α() + β()] + γ()− α()− β()
=γ()− α()[1− α()]− β()[1− α()]
=γ()− α()[1− α()]− γ()[1− α()]2
=α(){γ()[2− α()]− [1− α()]}
=
α()
4(1− ) + 2α(){[1− ][2− α()]− [1− α()][4(1− ) + 2α()]}
=
α()
4(1− ) + 2α(){2[α()]
2 − (5− 3)α()− 2(1− )}
=0,
where the third equality uses the fact that β() = γ()[1 − α()] (see proof of Lemma 2)
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and the last equality follows from the fact that α() =
5−3+
√
(5−3)2+16(1−)
4
is a root of the
quadratic equation 2[α()]2 − (5− 3)α()− 2(1− ) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 1: We provide the proof only for the buyer, a similar argument
works for the seller.
We have a fully separating equilibrium. So, in any continuation game [(m1b , m
2
b), (m
1
s, m
2
s)]
such that the message (m1i , m
2
i ) is used in equilibrium by some type (vi, di) of player i in the
communication stage, the belief of player j is that player i is of type (vi, di). On the other
hand, consider any oﬀ-the-equilibrium path continuation game [(m1b , m
2
b), (m
1
s, m
2
s)] such that
the message (m1i , m
2
i ) is not used in equilibrium by any type of player i in the communication
stage. The proof is such that we do not have to specify the belief of player j about player i
in such a continuation game. The reason is that according to the strategies speciﬁed in the
proposition, any type of any player i bids an extreme value (0 if she is a buyer and 1 if she
is a seller) such that player j cannot gain a positive amount by trading with player i. Thus,
in such a continuation game, irrespective of the belief of player j about player i, it is a best
response for any type of player j to also bid an extreme value (1 if she is a seller and 0 if
she is a buyer). Given this extreme bid by any type of player j, it is also a best response for
any type of player i to bid the extreme value. Thus, irrespective of the speciﬁc beliefs about
each others types, the strategies of both the players to bid extreme values are mutual best
responses in such a continuation game.
The proposition also does not specify the strategy of any type (vi, di) of any player
i in those continuation games [(m1b , m
2
b), (m
1
s, m
2
s)] such that both messages (m
1
b , m
2
b) and
(m1s, m
2
s) are used, respectively, by some type (v
′
b, d
′
b) of the buyer and (v
′
s, d
′
s) of the seller in
equilibrium but (m1i , m
2
i ) is not an equilibrium message of type (vi, di) of player i. In such a
continuation game, the belief of player j is that player i is of type (v′i, d
′
i) and thus, player j
will play optimally against that belief. Therefore, what type (vi, di) of player i does in such
a continuation game does not aﬀect the behavior of player j. The only requirement is that
type (vi, di) must believe that player j is of type (v
′
j , d
′
j) and play optimally against that
belief. However, instead of specifying the strategy of the strategic-type of player i in such
a continuation game, we argue that no strategic-type of player i can increase her expected
payoﬀ by imitating another type of player i in the communication stage and then playing
optimally in any continuation game. We do not need to make such an argument for the
behavioral-type of player i since she cannot deviate in the communication stage. Therefore,
if a behavioral type of player i were to ﬁnd herself in such a continuation game, then without
being speciﬁc about her strategy, we only say that she plays optimally against her belief that
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player j is of type (v′j , d
′
j).
Case 1: Consider the behavioral-type buyer of valuation vb. We only need to show that this
behavioral-type buyer is playing optimally in the continuation games.
First, consider the continuation game [(m1b , m
2
b), (m
1
s, m
2
s)] such that (m
1
b , m
2
b) = (vb, K)
and (m1s, m
2
s) is a message used in equilibrium by some type (vs, ds) of the seller in the
communication stage.
1. If m1s > m
1
b , then the behavioral-type buyer believes that the seller will bid 1. Thus,
the behavioral-type buyer cannot increase her payoﬀ by bidding any value other than
0.
2. If m1s ≤ m1b and m2s = K, then the behavioral-type buyer believes that the seller is a
behavioral type who will bid 1
2
(m1b + m
1
s) since in equilibrium, only this type of the
seller makes such an announcement in the communication stage. Since m1s ≤ m1b = vb,
it is a best response for the behavioral-type buyer to bid equal to 1
2
(m1b + m
1
s).
3. If m1s ≤ m1b and m2s = NK, then the behavioral-type buyer believes that the seller is a
strategic type who will bid m1b in the double auction since only this type of the seller
makes such an announcement in the communication stage. Since m1s ≤ m1b = vb, it is
a best response for the behavioral-type buyer to bid equal to m1b .
Next, consider the continuation game [(m1b , m
2
b), (m
1
s, m
2
s)] such that (m
1
i , m
2
i ) is not used
in equilibrium by any type of player i. Any type of the seller who ﬁnds herself in such
a continuation game bids 1. Thus, irrespective of the belief about the seller’s type, the
behavioral-type buyer cannot increase her payoﬀ by bidding any value other than 0.
Finally, consider the continuation game [(m1b , m
2
b), (m
1
s, m
2
s)] such that both messages
(m1b , m
2
b) and (m
1
s, m
2
s) are used, respectively, by some type (v
′
b, d
′
b) of the buyer and type
(v′s, d
′
s) of the seller in equilibrium but (m
1
b , m
2
b) = (vb, K). For reasons mentioned above,
we do not need to be more speciﬁc than say that the behavioral-type buyer bids optimally
against her belief in such a continuation game.
Case 2: Consider the strategic-type buyer of valuation vb.
Let’s begin with the ﬁnal double auction stage. First, consider the continuation game
[(m1b , m
2
b), (m
1
s, m
2
s)] such that (m
1
b , m
2
b) = (m
1(vb), NK) and (m
1
s, m
2
s) is a message used in
equilibrium by some type (vs, ds) of the seller in the communication stage.
1. If m1s > m
1
b , then the strategic-type buyer believes that the seller will bid 1. Thus, the
strategic-type buyer cannot increase her payoﬀ by bidding any value other than 0.
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2. If m1s ≤ m1b and m2s = K, then the strategic-type buyer believes that the seller is a
behavioral type who will bid m1s since in equilibrium, only this type of the seller makes
such an announcement in the communication stage. Now, m1b = m
1
b(vb) ≤ vb (follows
from Lemma 2). Since m1s ≤ m1b ≤ vb, it is a best response for the strategic-type buyer
to bid equal to m1s.
3. If m1s ≤ m1b and m2s = NK, then the strategic-type buyer believes that the seller is the
strategic type who will bid 1
2
(m1b +m
1
s) since in equilibrium, only this type of the seller
makes such an announcement in the communication stage. Now, m1b = m
1
b(vb) ≤ vb
(follows from Lemma 2). Since m1s ≤ m1b ≤ vb, it is a best response for the strategic-
type buyer to bid equal to 1
2
(m1b + m
1
s) ≤ vb.
Next, consider the continuation game [(m1b , m
2
b), (m
1
s, m
2
s)] such that (m
1
i , m
2
i ) is not used
in equilibrium by any type of player i. Any type of the seller who ﬁnds herself in such
a continuation game bids 1. Thus, irrespective of the belief about the seller’s type, the
strategic-type buyer cannot increase her payoﬀ by bidding any value other than 0.
Finally, consider the continuation games [(m1b , m
2
b), (m
1
s, m
2
s)] such that both messages
(m1b , m
2
b) and (m
1
s, m
2
s) are used, respectively, by some type (v
′
b, d
′
b) of the buyer and type
(v′s, d
′
s) of the seller in equilibrium but (m
1
b , m
2
b) = (m1(vb), NK). For reasons mentioned
above, we do not specify the strategy of the strategic-type buyer in such a continuation
game. Instead, we show that the strategic-type buyer of valuation vb cannot increase her
expected payoﬀ by imitating any type of the buyer in the communication stage and then
playing optimally in the ensuing continuation games.
Suppose the strategic-type buyer of valuation vb deviates in the communication stage to
an announcement (m1b , m
2
K) = (m1b(vb), NK).
First we argue that deviating to (vb, m
2
b) and then playing optimally in the continua-
tion games gives the strategic-type buyer of valuation vb at least as high expected payoﬀ
as deviating to (m1b , m
2
b) such that m
1
b > vb and then playing optimally in the continuation
games. Intuitively, announcing (m1b , m
2
b) instead of (vb, m
2
b) either generates new opportu-
nities to trade at a price higher than vb or increases the bid of the seller; thus it cannot
increase the strategic-type buyer’s expected payoﬀ. To see this formally, note that the set of
messages (mˆ1b , mˆ
2
b) that are not used in equilibrium by any type of the buyer are such that
mˆ1b ∈ (α() + β(), 1] and mˆ2b = NK (note that Lemma 2 implies that 1 > α() + β() since
1 > γ()). Since m1b > vb, it cannot be that the message (vb, m
2
b) is not used in equilibrium
by any type of the buyer while the message (m1b , m
2
b) is used in equilibrium by some type of
the buyer. If both messages (vb, m
2
b) and (m
1
b , m
2
b) are not used in equilibrium by any type of
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the buyer, then the expected payoﬀs are 0 from both deviations since any type of the seller
will bid 1. If the message (vb, m
2
b) is used in equilibrium by some type of the buyer while
the message (m1b , m
2
b) is not used in equilibrium by any type of the buyer, then the expected
payoﬀ from deviating to the latter message is 0 while the expected payoﬀ from deviating to
the former message is at least 0. Finally, suppose both messages (vb, m
2
b) and (m
1
b , m
2
b) are
used in equilibrium by some types of the buyer in equilibrium.
• If the seller announces m1s > m1b > vb, then the seller will bid 1 and hence by bidding
optimally, the strategic-type buyer will get 0 in such a continuation game irrespective
of whether she announces m1b or vb.
• If the seller announces m1s such that m1b ≥ m1s > vb, then the seller will bid at least
m1s in the continuation game. But then it is not optimal for the buyer to trade with
the seller and hence, the strategic-type buyer will get 0 in such a continuation game
irrespective of whether she announces m1b or vb.
• If m2b = K and the seller is a behavioral type who announces m1s ≤ vb < m1b , then
the seller will bid 1
2
(m1b +m
1
s) if the strategic-type buyer announces (m
1
b , K) while she
will bid a lower value of 1
2
(vb +m
1
s) ≤ vb if the strategic-type buyer announces (vb, K).
Thus, the strategic-type buyer would be weakly better-oﬀ if she announces (vb, K).
• If m2b = K and the seller is a strategic type who announces m1s ≤ vb < m1b , then
the seller will bid m1b if the strategic-type buyer announces (m
1
b , K) while she will
bid a lower value of vb if the strategic-type buyer announces (vb, K). Thus, by playing
optimally, the strategic-type buyer would get 0 in such a continuation game irrespective
of whether she announces m1b or vb.
• If m2b = NK and the seller is a behavioral type who announces m1s ≤ vb < m1b ,
then the seller will bid m1s irrespective of whether the strategic-type buyer announces
(m1b , NK) or (vb, NK). Thus, irrespective of whether the strategic-type buyer an-
nounces (m1b , NK) or (vb, NK), the strategic-type buyer, by bidding optimally in such
a continuation game, will trade at the price of m1s.
• If m2b = NK and the seller is a strategic type who announces m1s ≤ vb < m1b , then
the seller will bid 1
2
(m1b + m
1
s) if the strategic-type buyer announces (m
1
b , NK) while
she will bid a lower value of 1
2
(vb + m
1
s) ≤ vb if the strategic-type buyer announces
(vb, NK). Thus, the strategic-type buyer would be weakly better-oﬀ if she announces
(vb, NK).
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Next we argue that the expected payoﬀ of the strategic-type buyer if she follows her
equilibrium strategy is at least as high as her expected payoﬀ if she deviates to a message
(m1b , m
2
b) = (m1b(vb), NK), where m1b ≤ vb, and then plays optimally in the continuation
games. Combined with the above argument, it implies that the strategic-type buyer cannot
gain by deviating in the communication stage.
1. First, suppose vb < γ(). Then vb is less than m
1
s of any strategic-type seller. Thus, by
following her equilibrium strategy of announcing (vb, NK), this buyer will not trade
with any strategic-type seller while she will trade at price vs if the seller is a behavioral
type of valuation vs ≤ vb since such a seller announces m1s = vs and then bids truthfully
if m1b ≥ m1s and m2b = NK. Thus, the equilibrium expected payoﬀ of the strategic-type
buyer of valuation vb < γ() is 
∫ vb
0
(vb − vs)dvs = v
2
b
2
.
Now, suppose the strategic-type buyer of valuation vb deviates to an announcement
(m1b , NK), where m
1
b < vb. If the seller is a strategic type, then she announces m
1
s ≥
γ() > vb > m
1
b and thus bids 1 in the continuation game. Hence, our buyer still gets 0
in such a continuation game. Similarly, if the seller is a behavioral-type who announces
m1s > vb > m
1
b , then our buyer still gets 0 in the continuation game since the seller
bids 1. However, if the seller is a behavioral type and m1b < m
1
s ≤ vb, then our buyer
looses the opportunity to gainfully trade with the seller in the continuation game since
the seller bids 1. On the other hand, whenever m1s ≤ m1b < vb, our buyer still trades
with the behavioral-type seller at an unchanged price of m1s by bidding m
1
s, which is
optimal against the seller’s bid of m1s. Hence, she cannot gain by such a deviation.
Next, suppose the strategic-type buyer of valuation vb deviates to an announcement
(m1b , K), where m
1
b ≤ vb. If the seller is a strategic type, then she announces m1s ≥
γ() > vb ≥ m1b and thus bids 1 in the continuation game. Hence, our buyer still
gets 0 in such a continuation game. Similarly, if the seller is a behavioral-type who
announces m1s > vb ≥ m1b , then our buyer still gets 0 in the continuation game since
the seller bids 1. If m1b < vb, the seller is a behavioral type and m
1
b < m
1
s ≤ vb, then
our buyer looses the opportunity to gainfully trade with the seller at a price of m1s
in the continuation game since the seller now bids 1. On the other hand, whenever
m1s ≤ m1b ≤ vb, then the behavioral-type seller will bid 12(m1b +m1s) and thus our buyer
trades with the behavioral-type seller at a weakly higher price of 1
2
(m1b + m
1
s) instead
of m1s. Hence, she cannot gain by such a deviation.
2. Second, suppose vb ≥ γ(). Then by following her equilibrium strategy, she does
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not trade with the strategic-type seller who announces m1s = vs > α() + β() ≥
α()vb + β() = m
1
b . Thus, among the strategic types of the sellers, she only trades
with those who announce m1s = α()vs + γ() ≤ α()vb + β() = m1b at the price
1
2
(m1b + m
1
s) =
1
2
[α()vb + β() + α()vs + γ()]. Whereas, by following her equilibrium
strategy, she will trade at price vs if the seller is a behavioral type of valuation vs ≤
α()vb + β() = m
1
b since such a seller announces m
1
s = vs and then bids truthfully if
m1b ≥ m1s and m2b = NK. Thus, the equilibrium expected payoﬀ of the strategic-type
buyer of valuation vb ≥ γ() is
(1−)
∫ vb+β()−γ()α()
0
{
vb − 1
2
[α()vb + β() + α()vs + γ()]
}
dvs+
∫ α()vb+β()
0
{vb−vs}dvs.
Now, suppose the strategic-type buyer of valuation vb deviates to an announcement
(m1b , NK) where m
1
b = α()vb + β() and m1b ≤ vb.
(a) Assume that m1b < γ(). Then in the continuation games, she does no trade with
any strategic-type seller since for such a seller m1s ≥ γ(). By such a deviation,
the strategic-type buyer trades only with those behavioral types of the seller of
valuations vs ≤ m1b at the price m1s = vs since such a seller announces m1s = vs
and then bids truthfully if m1b ≥ m1s and m2b = NK. But our strategic-type buyer
is able to trade with such a behavioral-type seller at the price of vs even if she
announces her equilibrium message α()vb + β() > m
1
b . Therefore, she cannot
gain by such a deviation.
(b) Assume that γ() ≤ m1b ≤ min{vb, α() + β()}. Then in the continuation games,
she does not trade with the strategic-type seller who announces m1s = vs > α()+
β() ≥ α()vb + β() ≥ m1b . In the continuation games, she trades only with
those strategic types of the seller who announce m1s = α()vs + γ() ≤ m1b at
the price 1
2
[m1b + α()vs + γ()] since such a seller bids
1
2
(m1b + m
1
s) if m
1
s ≤ m1b
and m2b = NK. In the continuation games, our strategic-type buyer also trades
with only those behavioral types of the seller of valuations vs ≤ m1b at price vs
since such a seller announces m1s = vs and then bids truthfully if m
1
b ≥ m1s and
m2b = NK. Therefore, the expected payoﬀ of our strategic-type buyer from this
deviation is
U(m1b) ≡ (1− )
∫ m1b−γ()
α()
0
{
vb − 1
2
[m1b + α()vs + γ()]
}
dvs + 
∫ m1
b
0
{vb − vs}dvs.
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Maximizing U(m1b) with respect to m
1
b , we get that
m1b =
2(1− ) + 2α()
3(1− ) + 2α()vb +
(1− )γ()
3(1− ) + 2α()
=α()vb + β(),
where 2(1−)+2α()
3(1−)+2α()
= α() since α() is the root of the quadratic equation 2[α()]2−
(5− 3)α()− 2(1− ) = 0. Thus, we have a contradiction.
(c) Assume that vb ≥ m1b > α() + β(). Then our strategic buyer is deviating to a
message that is not used in equilibrium by any type of the buyer. Thus, any type
of the seller will bid 1 in the continuation game and so our buyer will not be able
to trade. Hence, she cannot gain by such a deviation.
Next, suppose the strategic-type buyer of valuation vb deviates to an announcement
(m1b , K) where m
1
b ≤ vb.
(a) Assume that m1b < γ(). Then in the continuation games, she does no trade with
any strategic-type seller since for such a seller m1s ≥ γ(). By such a deviation,
the strategic-type buyer trades only with those behavioral types of the seller of
valuations vs ≤ m1b at the price 12(m1b + m1s) ≥ vs since such a seller announces
m1s = vs and then bids
1
2
(m1b + m
1
s) if m
1
b ≥ m1s and m2b = K. But our strategic-
type buyer is able to trade with such a behavioral-type seller at the price of vs if
she announces her equilibrium message α()vb+β() > m
1
b . Therefore, she cannot
gain by such a deviation.
(b) Assume that γ() ≤ m1b ≤ min{vb, α() + β()}. Then in the continuation games,
she does not trade with the strategic-type seller who announces m1s = vs > α()+
β() ≥ α()vb + β() ≥ m1b . In the continuation games, she trades only with
those strategic types of the seller who announce m1s = α()vs + γ() ≤ m1b at the
price m1b since such a seller bids m
1
b if m
1
s ≤ m1b and m2b = K. In the continuation
games, our strategic-type buyer also trades with only those behavioral types of the
seller of valuations vs ≤ m1b at the price 12(m1b + vs) since such a seller announces
m1s = vs and then bids
1
2
(m1b + vs) if m
1
b ≥ m1s and m2b = K. If the strategic-
type buyer had instead announced [m1b , NK], then she would have traded with
all those strategic types of the seller who announce m1s = α()vs + γ() ≤ m1b at
the price 1
2
(m1b + m
1
s) ≤ m1b since such a seller bids 12(m1b + m1s) if m1s ≤ m1b and
m2b = NK and with all those behavioral types of the seller of valuations vs ≤ m1b
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at the price vs ≤ 12(m1b + vs) since such a seller announces m1s = vs and then bids
vs if m
1
b ≥ m1s and m2b = NK. Thus, whenever γ() ≤ m1b ≤ min{vb, α() +β()},
the strategic-type buyer’s expected payoﬀ if she announces [m1b , NK] is weakly
higher than her expected payoﬀ if she announces [m1b , K]. But we have already
argued above that the strategic-type buyer cannot gain by deviating to [m1b , NK],
where γ() ≤ m1b ≤ min{vb, α() + β()}.
(c) Assume that α()+β() < m1b ≤ vb. Then in the continuation games, she does not
trade with any strategic-type seller of valuation vs > m
1
b since such a strategic-type
seller announce m1s = vs in the communication stage. In the continuation games,
she trades with all those strategic types of the seller whose valuation vs ≤ m1b
because if vs ≤ α() + β(), then m1s = α()vs + γ() ≤ α() + β() (follows from
Lemma 3) while if vs > α() + β(), then m
1
s = vs. Moreover, she trades with
all such strategic types of the seller at the price of m1b since such a seller bids m
1
b
if m1s ≤ m1b and m2b = K. In the continuation games, she also trades with only
those behavioral types of the seller of valuations vs ≤ m1b at the price 12(m1b + vs)
since such a seller announces m1s = vs and then bids
1
2
(m1b + vs) if m
1
b ≥ m1s and
m2b = K. Therefore, the expected payoﬀ of our strategic-type buyer from this
deviation is
V (m1b) ≡(1− )
∫ m1
b
0
{
vb −m1b
}
dvs + 
∫ m1
b
0
{
vb − 1
2
(m1b + vs)
}
dvs.
Taking the derivative of V (m1b) with respect to m
1
b , we get that
V ′(m1b) = (1− )(vb − 2m1b) + 
(
vb − 3
2
m1b
)
< 0, (1)
where the inequality follows from the fact that m1b > α() + β() >
2
3
. There-
fore, V (α() + β()) > V (m1b). But V (α() + β()) is the expected payoﬀ of the
strategic-type buyer of valuation vb if she deviates to (α()+β(), K) and we have
already argued that she cannot gain over her equilibrium expected payoﬀ by such
a deviation.
Proof of Corollary 1: The corollary follows since γ() < 1
4
, α()vb + β() > vb − 14 and
vs +
1
4
> α()vs + γ().
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